Crime And Punishment

[Richard B the EMT]

What follows, here, is a report from the New York City Office of Administrative Trials And Hearings (OATH), concerning an EMT caught using drugs. I post it, with the EMT's name, and associated case numbers, redacted, as a cautionary mention to all with similar issues to seek help!

Fire Dep’t v. XXXXXXX

OATH Index No. XXXXXXX (July 30, 2010), superseding (July 28, 2010)

Respondent, an emergency medical technician, tested positive for

cocaine in a workplace random drug test. Termination of

respondent’s employment recommended.

______________________________________________________

NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIALS AND HEARINGS

In the Matter of

FIRE DEPARTMENT

Petitioner

-against-

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Respondent

______________________________________________________

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JULIO RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Law Judge

This disciplinary proceeding was referred by petitioner, the Fire Department, pursuant to

section 75 of the Civil Service Law1. The Department alleges that XXXXXXXXXX, an Emergency

Medical Technician (“EMT”), tested positive for cocaine in a workplace random drug test on

August 25, 2007, in violation of the Department’s General Regulations and Emergency Medical

Service (“EMS”) Operating Guide Procedure, specifically, the Substance Abuse Policy (ALJ Ex.

1).

At trial petitioner presented the testimony of three witnesses including an expert.

Respondent testified on his own behalf. Both parties presented documentary evidence. The

record was held open for several weeks for the submission of closing briefs.

It is undisputed that respondent tested positive for cocaine during a workplace random

drug test. For the reasons below, I recommend that respondent’s employment be terminated.

1 The Report and Recommendation of July 28, 2010 incorrectly stated that respondent was charged under section

15-113 of the Administrative Code, a regulation regarding firefighter discipline. Although respondent works for the

Fire Department, as an EMT he is correctly charged with misconduct under Civil Service Law section 75. Only the

citation to statutory authority is changed; this Supplemental Report and Recommendation is identical in content to

that issued on July 28, 2010.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner alleges that on August 25, 2007, respondent tested positive for cocaine and that

he was under the influence of cocaine at work. Petitioner seeks termination of respondent’s

employment for his alleged misconduct. Respondent does not dispute that he tested positive for

cocaine, but denies that he was under the influence of cocaine at work (Tr. 189). Respondent did

not challenge the accuracy or sufficiency of the drug test (Tr. 121-22). The test results revealed

that respondent’s urine sample contained 42,250 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine metabolite,

significantly above the cut-off level of 150 nanograms per milliliter. Respondent’s defense is

that he was addicted to cocaine and is now a recovered addict.

Respondent has been an EMT with the Department since 1993. He is certified in various

aspects of emergency care, including, bleeding control, CPR and oxygen administration (Tr.

136). In the regular course of his job duties, respondent made decisions about patient care (Tr.

186) and drove the ambulance (Tr. 189-90).

Respondent testified that he used cocaine “on and off” for over 20 years (Tr. 184)

including the 14 years he was employed as an EMT (Tr. 183, 219). He testified that he used

cocaine four to five times per week (Tr. 177) but never used drugs at work. He specifically

denied using cocaine in an ambulance and in the Medical Supply Unit while on restricted duty

(Tr. 186-87, 189, 218). Respondent explained that he used cocaine when he had money to buy

it; if he did not have money he did not purchase and use cocaine (Tr. 179, 187). He stated that

his cocaine use made him feel “withdrawn” from his family and caused him to not want to

participate in family gatherings (Tr. 149). Respondent testified that he would stop using drugs

for periods of up to ten months but would eventually relapse (Tr. 184).

On May 9, 2007, respondent sought the Department’s assistance in addressing his

cocaine use (Tr. 139). Respondent was sent immediately to an in-patient rehabilitation care

facility outside of New York City where he remained for 28 days concluding on June 6, 2007

(Tr. 140; Resp. Ex. . Four days after he was released, respondent used cocaine and on June

11, 2007, he was sent back to the same facility for another 14 days (Tr. 143; Resp. Ex. . After

his release on June 25, 2007, respondent was referred to outpatient counseling services.

Respondent testified that after attending a couple of sessions, he again used cocaine (Tr. 148-49).

On August 25, 2007, respondent tested positive for cocaine in a random drug test

administered by the Department (Tr. 125-26; Pet. Ex. 7). On that day respondent’s partner was

randomly selected for drug testing (Tr. 29). In accordance with Department policy, respondent

was tested as well (Tr. 30). Respondent was in his regular duties and was in fact pulled off from

driving the ambulance in order to be tested (Tr. 189-90).

On August 31, 2007, respondent re-entered the rehabilitation facility for another 28-day

program (Tr. 151). In October 2007, respondent was reinstated by the Department and was

placed on a restricted duty assignment in the Medical Supply Unit pending the outcome of this

disciplinary matter. In the Medical Supply Unit, respondent had no access to narcotics (Tr. 135,

170; Resp. Brief at 7) or patient care responsibilities (Tr. 209). His duties consist of distributing

basic emergency care supplies, such as bandages, breathing masks, and glucose for diabetics, to

the different battalions (Tr. 170).

Respondent testified that in October 2007 he started another outpatient program but that

he relapsed three times between then and July 2008 (Tr. 211-12). In July 2008, he changed

programs and successfully completed outpatient care in October 2008 (Tr. 215; Resp. Ex. H)

where he tested clean at every urine test (Tr. 215; Resp. Ex. I). Respondent testified that he

attends Narcotics Anonymous meetings (Tr. 167) and that he is a recovered addict (Tr. 166-67,

177, 213).

On December 21, 2009, respondent tested negative for cocaine or any other illicit drug in

a random drug test administered by the Department (Tr. 122). Respondent has not returned to

active duty as an EMT since testing positive for cocaine (Tr. 153).

At issue is whether respondent’s positive drug test is disciplinable as misconduct.

Respondent argued that his positive drug test was the result of drug addiction, a disability

recognized by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) and New York State’s

Human Rights Law (the “HRL”) and that terminating his employment would violate his right to

have his disability accommodated in the workplace.

The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability...” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2010). The term

“disability” is defined in part as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more of the major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2010). The term “discriminate” is

defined as including “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,

unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112((5)(A)

(2010). The word “reasonable” is “a relational term,” meaning that whether or not something

constitutes a reasonable accommodation is fact-specific. Borkowski v. Valley Central School

District, 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995); Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d

379, 385(2d Cir. 1996).

As Judge Merris explained in Human Resources Admin. v. Varone, OATH Index No.

695/01 at 4 (December 26, 2001), while this tribunal lacks jurisdiction to award relief under the

ADA, it has previously held that OATH may consider an affirmative defense founded upon the

ADA in a case brought pursuant to the Civil Service Law. See Dep’t of Parks and Recreation v.

O’Connell, OATH Index No. 1769/97 (Oct. 14, 1997) (reinstatement from section 72 medical

leave); Dep’t of Correction v. Noriega-Harvey, OATH Index No. 1250/97 (Aug. 14, 1997)

(disability proceeding pursuant to section 71); Human Resources Admin. v. Varone, OATH

Index No. 457/95 at 9 (Mar. 17, 1995) (disciplinary action pursuant to section 75); Dep’t of

Sanitation v. Troy, OATH Index No. 842/95 at 9 (Feb. 1, 1995), rev’d on other grounds,

Comm’r Decision (Feb. 10, 1995) (disability proceeding under section 73); Dep’t of Correction

v. Noriega-Harvey, OATH Index No. 575/93, mem. dec. at 10 - 12 (Feb. 17, 1993) (disability

proceeding pursuant to section 72). OATH has entertained these affirmative defenses cognizant

of its responsibility to “consider the legality of agency actions with regard to this federal law as

part of our obligation to provide a complete evaluation of the legality of all options available to

the appointing agency.” Noriega-Harvey, 1250/97 at 9. However, OATH has not considered the

ADA as a defense in cases where the respondent failed to make a request for accommodation

prior to the date of the misconduct charged therein. See Dep’t of Correction v. Astacio, OATH

Index No. 1715/99 at 4 (July 14, 1999), aff’d, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm’n Item No. CD 01-36-SA

(Apr. 17, 2001); Human Resources Admin. v. Delgado, OATH Index No. 1909/00 at 4 (Nov. 15,

2000), aff’d, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm’n Item No. CD01-63-SA (Aug. 1, 2001).

While it is true that respondent sought the Department’s assistance in addressing his

cocaine use on May 9, 2007, this alone is insufficient to establish that respondent sought an

accommodation. There is no evidence that respondent’s drug use caused him to experience

workplace problems. To the contrary, respondent maintained throughout the trial that he never

used drugs while at work and that his drug use did not affect his ability to fulfill the functions of

his job. The record before me establishes that respondent failed to request an accommodation

prior to his positive drug test on August 25, 2007.

Assuming respondent had requested an accommodation, it is questionable whether he

qualified for ADA and/or HRL protection. Respondent argues that his positive drug test was the

result of drug addiction, a disability recognized by the ADA and HRL. The burden to prove the

existence of the disability rests on respondent. Fire Dep’t v. Kelly, OATH Index No. 804/06 at

10 (June 9, 2006), modified on penalty, Comm’r Dec. (Jan. 2, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Kelly v.

Scoppetta, 56 A.D.3d 475 (2d Dep’t 2008); Fire Dep’t v. Kirk, OATH Index No. 441/06 at 7-8

(Apr. 26, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Kirk v. City of New York, 47 A.D.3d 406 (1st Dep’t 2008).

Drug use, even frequent drug use, is not the same as legal addiction under either federal

or state law. Both the ADA and the HRL recognize addiction as a disability, 42 U.S.C. §

12114( (2010); Executive Law § 292(21) (Lexis 2010); 9 N. Y. C. R. R. § 466.11©(2)(i),

(h)(1) (Lexis 2010), only when the person claiming addiction as a disability can show that he has

become rehabilitated and incidents of drug use are in the past. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(; 9 N. Y. C.

R. R. § 466.11(h)(1). A current addicted drug user has no protection, 42 U.S.C. § 12114(; 9 N.

Y. C. R. R. § 466.11(h)(4).

As opposed to addicts, casual users of drugs or alcohol are not protected. For the

purposes of the Human Rights Law, the Mental Hygiene Law of New York State defines alcohol

addiction as “compulsive ingestion beyond the control of the sick person.” Mental Hyg. Law §

1.03(13) (Lexis 2010); see also McEniry v. Landi, 84 N.Y.2d 554, 559 (1994), and “chemical

dependence” to include “a pattern of compulsive use.” Mental Hyg. Law §1.03(44) (Lexis

2010). Therefore to be considered disabled, respondent must demonstrate that his past drug use

was beyond his control. Kirk, OATH 441/06 at 9; Kelly, OATH 804/06 at 10. Under the HRL,

voluntary drug use is simple misconduct, not a disability, even when the use is frequent and

respondent seeks rehabilitation services for his use of drugs. See Fire Dep’t v. Peltonen, OATH

Index No. 2101/08 (Oct. 9, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Peltonen v. Scoppetta, 25 Misc. 3d 1208A

(Kings Co. Sup. Ct. 2009); see also Fire Dep’t v. Zoda, OATH Index No. 995/10 at 3 (Mar. 18,

2010).

Contrary to his assertion in his closing brief, respondent did not prove that his use of

cocaine was compulsive and involuntary. Respondent did not offer any evidence to establish

compulsive ingestion beyond his control. As discussed below, the evidence establishes the

opposite, that his cocaine use was knowing and voluntary, and therefore not a disability. The

fact that he considers himself a former addict is insufficient to satisfy his burden.

Even if respondent had proven that he was an addict, to be entitled to an accommodation

under either the ADA or the HRL he must also prove that it was a disability.

The ADA defines a disability as: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)

(2010)(emphasis added). Respondent must prove he was substantially limited in addition to

proving he was a cocaine addict. Regional Economic Community Action Program v. City of

Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002).

The HRL defines a disability as “a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from

anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a

normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory

diagnostic techniques…” Exec. Law § 296(21)(a) (Lexis 2010).

Respondent failed to prove, medically or otherwise, that he suffered from psychological,

physical, or employment problems. Nor was there any evidence that respondent suffered a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities.

Respondent’s vague and unconvincing assertion that he felt “out of place” from his family and

opted not to attend family gatherings (Tr. 149) is insufficient to establish a disability.

This tribunal has consistently held that the ingestion of illegal drugs is a knowing,

voluntary act that provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discipline, including

termination. See e.g., Zoda, OATH 995/10 at 3; Peltonen, OATH 2101/08; Kelly, OATH 804/06

at 10.

Respondent’s evidence that his cocaine use was involuntary is marginal. It consisted of

his testimony during which he referred to himself as an addict and two summary information

sheets from Veritas Villa Inc. The first information sheet shows that respondent was admitted

on May 9, 2007 and June 11, 2007. Each admission listed a diagnosis/Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) code of 303.9 and 304.2. The second information sheet

reveals that respondent was admitted August 31, 2007. This admission listed a diagnosis/DSM

code of 304.2 and 305.0. DSM code 304.9 is entitled alcohol dependence, 305.0 is entitled

alcohol abuse, and 304.2 is entitled cocaine dependence. Task Force on DSM-IV, Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 195, 196, 222 (American Psychiatric Association 4th

ed. 1994). However, respondent offered no evidence to explain the diagnosis or the meaning

and/or significance of the DSM codes. Without evidence/testimony, expert or otherwise, to

explain the DSM codes, they shed no light on whether respondent’s cocaine use was involuntary.

The evidence before me, however, establishes that respondent’s use of cocaine was

knowing and suggests that it was voluntary. Respondent testified that he used cocaine on and off

for over 20 years (Tr. 184) and that he ingested cocaine four to five times a week (Tr. 177). He

explained that he would stop using cocaine for extended periods of time up to ten months but

would eventually start using again (Tr. 184). Respondent adamantly maintained that he “never”

used cocaine while at work during the fourteen years he has been employed as an EMT (Tr. 186-

87, 189, 218). Furthermore, respondent acknowledged that he used cocaine only when he had

money to purchase it (Tr. 179, 187). Respondent’s testimony establishes that he had the capacity

to choose when and where to use cocaine; he also had the ability to limit his drug use to his

budget. Based on a preponderance of the credible evidence, I find that respondent’s cocaine use

was knowing and voluntary and that his subsequent positive drug test violated the Department's

drug policy and is misconduct.

The propriety and accuracy of the August 25, 2007 positive drug test are not at issue.

Therefore, the charges are sustained, with the exception of Charge 1 which alleges that

respondent worked under the influence of an illicit drug. While there is no doubt that

respondent’s urine sample tested positive for an exceedingly high level of cocaine metabolites,

the Department’s expert witness testified that “in the urine, it's different from the blood level in

terms of the actual effect. . . [T]he cocaine and the cocaine metabolites have to be in the blood

for the effect to occur. But if somebody has this kind of value in the urine [42,250 nanograms

per milliliter of cocaine metabolite], we know that sometimes in the, at most 48 to 72 hours

before they ingested a lot of cocaine and were influenced by that at the time” (Tr. 126). There is

no evidence to establish when respondent ingested the cocaine or that he was under the influence

of cocaine while at work on August 25, 2007, when he was tested.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence

that on August 25, 2007, while on duty, respondent’s urine

tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolites at

42,250 nanograms per milliliter, above the cut-off level of 150

nanograms per milliliter in violation of the Department’s

General Regulations 101-01 §§ 4.2.12, 4.2.50, and 4.2.51 and

the Department’s Substance Policy 113-02 §§ 6.1A and 6.1D.

2. Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible

evidence that on August 25, 2007, respondent was under the

influence of cocaine at work.

THEREFORE:

Charge 2, insofar as it alleges a violation of the Department’s Substance Policy 113-02 §

6.1A, charge 3, charge 4, and charge 5 are sustained. Charge 1 is dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Respondent’s personnel file contains two instances of prior discipline over a 17-year

career with the Department, one in 2005 for improper signal, resulting in a loss of five days

leave, and the other in 1996 for excessive absence, resulting in a loss of three days pay. The

Department seeks termination of his employment, while respondent alleges he cannot be

disciplined at all.

Respondent is incorrect. With regards to the ADA, nothing in it forbids an employer

from either engaging in drug tests in the workplace, or making employment decisions based on

those tests. 42 USC § 12114(d)(2)(2010). An employer is specifically permitted to “…hold an

employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification

standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other

employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or

alcoholism of such employee.” 42 USC § 12114©(4)(2010). In ADA cases involving

alcoholism and illegal drug use, there is a distinction between disability-caused conduct and

disability itself as a cause for termination. Vandenbroek v. PSEG Power Conn. L.L.C., 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18320, at *16 (D. Conn. 2009), aff’d, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26965 (2d Cir.

2009); see also Daft v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 251 Fed. Appx. 480, 482 (9th Cir. 2007)

(alcoholic employee who tested positive for alcohol in the workplace was properly terminated

for his misconduct, not for being an alcoholic). When an employee claims that they were fired

for misconduct that was caused by substance addiction, it is not actionable under the ADA even

if true. Vandenbroek, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *17. Thus respondent may be disciplined,

9

including with termination, regardless of whether he can claim addiction as a disability and the

cause of the positive drug test. Id. at *15-17. A violation of the employer’s conduct rules is a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination against which a claim under the ADA must

fail unless the employee offers some proof that the reason given for the firing is just a pretext.

Id. Respondent offered no evidence of pretext.

Respondent’s final argument is that, pursuant to McEniry v. Landi, 84 N.Y.2d 554

(1994), he cannot be terminated because he is at present a recovered addict. While this tribunal

is not convinced that McEniry is applicable to the circumstances present here, it is clear that

respondent’s failure to prove his rehabilitation alone would deny him a McEniry defense to

termination.

The credible evidence does not support a finding that respondent is rehabilitated. The

evidence of respondent’s current rehabilitation consists of a schedule of completed therapy

sessions, a completion certificate from his most recent rehab program (Resp. Ex. H, I), and one

negative workplace drug test of December 21, 2009 (Resp. Ex. A; Tr. 122). This evidence is not

persuasive in light of respondent’s admitted long history of relapse. Respondent’s testimony

proves that after periods of sobriety, respondent frequently relapsed and used cocaine while

employed as an EMT, and that he also relapsed and used cocaine after being placed on a

restricted duty in the Medical Supply Unit. Respondent testified that he had stopped using drugs

for periods of up to ten months in the past (Tr. 184) and then started using cocaine again, many

times, with each relapse resulting in more severe drug use (Tr. 185).

The Court of Appeals held in McEniry that each review is individualized. “Thus, in the

appropriate case, an alcoholic who is found not to be actually rehabilitated, or who is shown to

have an established propensity to relapse may be found unable to perform the job in a reasonable

manner.” McEniry 84 N.Y.2d at 561.

The Department’s EMS Substance Policy sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 state that its mission

is

…to provide timely, professional pre-hospital emergency medical

care and transportation that is of the highest quality, administered

with skill, compassion and dignity, to all who require such services

within the City of New York . . . The efficient performance of this

mission demands the highest level of mental and physical fitness,

stamina and alertness. The lives of citizens and first responders are

dependent upon the fitness, stamina and alertness of EMS

employees. Drugs and alcohol alter alertness, judgment, physical

agility and the ability to fulfill one’s work responsibilities. Any

impairment of the employee’s physical and mental capabilities

increases the danger of accidents and injuries, not only to the

employee, but also to other first responders and to the public. The

FDNY must do all it can to ensure that its employees remain drug

free.

Substance Abuse Policy: Drugs/Alcohol, EMS OGP 113-02 (May 7, 2007)

The Department’s guidelines call for termination on the first offense when the Drug

Policy is violated. Termination has been recommended when there is a positive workplace drug

test even in cases where a respondent has shown exceptional mitigating circumstances leading to

the drug use. See Dep’t of Sanitation v. Betancourt, OATH Index No. 1463/07 at 6-7 (May 7,

2007), aff’d, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm’n Item No. CD 07-103-SA (Nov. 5, 2007)(sanitation worker

relapsed and tested positive for cocaine after being traumatized by accidentally hitting and

severely injuring a civilian with his truck); Peltonen, OATH 2101/08 at 21(firefighter who

worked in search and rescue operations at the World Trade Center site and was traumatized by

that experience relapsed and tested positive for cocaine). Respondent, by contrast, has shown

little to nothing in terms of mitigation.

Respondent’s misconduct is contrary to the Department’s mission and poses a substantial

safety risk that the Department must weigh heavily. I recommend that respondent’s employment

be terminated.

Julio Rodriguez

Administrative Law Judge

July 30, 2010

SUBMITTED TO:

SALVATORE J. CASSANO

Commissioner

APPEARANCES:

BELINDA DELGADO, ESQ

Attorney for Petitioner

DAVID MCGRUDER, ESQ.

Attorney for Respondent

As a mention, I do not know the EMT mentioned in the action quoted.

[HERBIE1]

We have random drug and alcohol testing here. When it was first instituted, I could not believe how many people actually objected to the idea. Not fair, unconstitutional, it's a witch hunt, what we do on our own time is nobody's business, etc. We heard all the excuses.

All I would say to these people was- What if your partner, your officer, or a guy on your company was impaired? What if that person's impairment cost you time, money, or even your LIFE? We aren't making widgets in a factory, we have the lives of the public- and each other- in our hands every day. We SHOULD be held to a different standard than others, and if you cannot agree with that, then I suggest you are in the wrong profession.

[emtannie]

That is an interesting article. The employee argued that he had a drug addiction, which should be considered a disability, and that his employment should be protected under the disability act.

The findings of the tribunal showed that although the employer could not prove that the employee was under the influence at work, the employer could terminate employment based on the drug testing.

It discussed the fine line between firing someone because they are an addict and firing someone because of misconduct which may have been a result of the addiction.

I realize that people with addictions (and in this case, the tribunal wasn’t convinced the employee truly had an addiction) are not always able to control those urges and actions related to the addiction, but I am not convinced that they should be able to use the addiction as an excuse to justify those actions and not receive punishment for those actions.

Dr. Spock stated “…the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.” (The Wrath of Khan, 1982) and although I am not a Trekkie, I do believe that the needs of the patient that this employee may deal with outweigh the need to protect his employment.

There are consequences to any action, and those consequences may be good or bad. More and more, we are becoming a society of excuses, where bad behaviors are dismissed with labels of “syndrome,” “addiction,” “illness,” “disorder,” rather than holding the individual responsible for their actions. At some point, a person chooses a path. How can we make excuses for the destination of that path when there were choices along the way?

I agree with the tribunal in the decision, and am glad the employer terminated this employee. The risks of keeping this employee outweigh the benefits.

[Richard B the EMT]

Tangent for a short comment...

Dr. Spock stated "…the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few." (The Wrath of Khan, 1982) and although I am not a Trekkie, I do believe that the needs of the patient that this employee may deal with outweigh the need to protect his employment.

Doctor Benjamin Spock wrote baby care books in the late 1950s into the late 1960s, and then tried protecting those babies by protesting the American involvement in the war in Viet Nam.

Lieutenant Commander/Commander/Captain/Ambassador Spock (Choose one from references to the original Star Trek series, the movies, ST/The Next Generation, or the time warped newest ST movie) is not a doctor, really proving that you're not a "Trekkie"; furthermore, a "Trekker" is a fan of the various TV series, the movies, the books, or various combinations of them, and a "Trekkie" is a pubescent girl who wants to have Mr Spock's baby!

Sorry, Annie, but I am a Trekker.

We now resume normal operations ...

Edited November 7, 2010 by Richard B the EMT

[DwayneEMTP]

Tangent for a short comment...

Doctor Benjamin Spock wrote baby care books in the late 1950s into the late 1960s, and then tried protecting those babies by protesting the American involvement in the war in Viet Nam.

Lieutenant Commander/Commander/Captain/Ambassador Spock (Choose one from references to the original Star Trek series, the movies, ST/The Next Generation, or the time warped newest ST movie) is not a doctor, really proving that you're not a "Trekkie"; furthermore, a "Trekker" is a fan of the various TV series, the movies, the books, or various combinations of them, and a "Trekkie" is a pubescent girl who wants to have Mr Spock's baby!

Sorry, Annie, but I am a Trekker.

We now resume normal operations ...

I get your point, certainly, but you still kind of freak me out when you go into these types of explanations... Just sayin.. :-)

Dwayne

[Richard B the EMT]

You must have forgotten this person:

Spock

Edited November 7, 2010 by Richard B the EMT

[spenac]

It amazes me how many people when caught in a drug test then decide they have a problem. Why is it that they could not have requested help prior to getting caught? I believe New York has a self report where you can get help. But I guess they can try and claim the shock of getting caught made the realize they have a problem.

[Richard B the EMT]

But I guess they can try and claim the shock of getting caught made the realize they have a problem.

By current policy, by then it's too late. Ask for the help, and usually there are no repercussions, but get caught and THEN ask?

[Lone Star]

By current policy, by then it's too late. Ask for the help, and usually there are no repercussions, but get caught and THEN ask?

There's a spate of 'home remedies' that are supposed to make it possible to 'flush the system' and beat the drug test (like drinking a quart of dill pickle juice). It's no wonder that these people think that they can be a 'stoner' and not get caught. What they fail to realize is that these homeopathic 'remedies' are just bunk, and when you add to the fact that these drug tests have gotten more complex as time goes by....you end up with a bunch of people who are slack jawed shocked when they get busted for 'dropping hot'.

After having attended inpatient rehab at least 3 times, and relapsing at least as many times, it's no wonder that he thought he could have claimed protection under the ADA. Too bad he didn't do his homework and find the full extend and limitations of that Act...

I have an opinion on why people turn to alcohol, drugs and other substances to cope with 'real life', but if I post them; all I'm going to do is piss people off and turn this thread into a 'war zone'. If you're interested in my thoughts and are willing to listen to the reasoning I have behind these opinions, feel free to drop me a PM. I will respond to those that are willing to DISCUSS it, but I will NOT respond to being 'beaten down' until I change my thought process!